

Congress of the United States

Washington, DC 20515

July 20, 2026

Acting Director Nick Andersen
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
245 Murray Lane SW
Washington, DC 20528

Attorney General Todd Blanche
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Ave NW
Washington, DC 20530

Dear Attorney General Blanche and Director Andersen:

We write regarding recent cases of Russian interference in recent European elections, including in Moldova's September 2025 elections and Armenia's June 2026 elections. Russian activities around these elections reflect a clear evolution in tactics, with a growing reliance on artificial intelligence and coordinated disinformation campaigns. We would be mistaken not to view these developments as a warning and assess our own election security measures ahead of our November 2026 elections.

For years, Moldova has faced Russian efforts to undermine its path towards EU alignment through illegal financing, cyberattacks and disinformation.¹ In November 2024, Moldovan President Maia Sandu was reelected on a pro-European platform despite allegedly substantial Russian election interference. At that time, Sandu accused the Kremlin of using criminal groups in Gagauzia to bring in Russian money to finance destabilizing activities and "to bribe the elections."² By Moldova's September 2025 parliamentary elections, however, researchers documented a significantly more sophisticated and coordinated Russian influence campaign built on new infrastructure and heavy artificial intelligence usage.³

Leading up to the 2025 elections, multiple online monitoring groups tracked coordinated Russian propaganda and disinformation campaigns that aimed to diminish support for the ruling pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS). Fake websites impersonated legitimate Western media and paid "engagement farms" across Africa, while AI bots were utilized in comment sections deriding PAS and the EU.⁴ Authorities identified at least 10 main tools of electoral interference, including the use of an estimated €100 million in cryptocurrencies, deepfakes, paid protests, and Kremlin-affiliated clergy to manipulate public opinion. Despite this deeply entrenched interference, PAS ultimately won a major victory in the September 28 parliamentary elections, marking a major geopolitical milestone in Moldova's alignment with the EU.

In June 2026, Russia followed a similar playbook to interfere in Armenia's parliamentary elections. After years of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan deepening Armenia's ties with the United States and Europe, Russia reportedly intensified covert efforts to undermine his bid for re-election.⁵ These efforts included coordinated online disinformation campaigns designed to discredit the Pashinyan government. From fabricated news videos to anti-Pashinyan news sites, Russia's disinformation campaign followed the playbook seen in cases like the Moldova elections.

There are also reports that the Kremlin established a new department, the Directorate for Strategic Cooperation and Partnership, to oversee the elections in Armenia. This department allegedly spent millions of dollars in attempts to transport voters living abroad from Russia to Armenia.⁶ Immediately following the election, Russian state media sought to

¹ [Moldovans face AI-driven Russian disinformation ahead of key election | AP News](#)

² <https://www.reuters.com/world/us-britain-canada-accuse-russia-plot-influence-moldova-election-2024-06-13/>

³ [Moldovans face AI-driven Russian disinformation ahead of key election | AP News](#)

⁴ [Moldovans face AI-driven Russian disinformation ahead of key election | AP News](#)

⁵ <https://www.reuters.com/world/imported-voters-fake-websites-russias-covert-efforts-stop-armenias-pivot-west-2026-05-29/>

⁶ <https://www.reuters.com/world/imported-voters-fake-websites-russias-covert-efforts-stop-armenias-pivot-west-2026-05-29/>

delegitimize the results, claiming the outcome was fraudulent. In July 2026, Armenia's constitutional court rejected a request by the country's pro-Russian opposition to overturn the results of the parliamentary election.⁷

Together, the Moldova and Armenia cases demonstrate that Russia has continued to develop its election interference strategy by combining traditional influence operations with coordinated online disinformation campaigns and targeted usage of artificial intelligence. Although these attempts ultimately failed to achieve their apparent political goals, they highlight Russia's willingness to devote substantial financial and technological resources to invisible influence campaigns against democratic elections. We urge you to look to the Moldovan and Armenian cases to assess vulnerabilities ahead of the November 2026 midterm elections here in the United States.

Thank you for your attention to this issue. We look forward to your prompt response.

Sincerely,



Deborah K. Ross
Member of Congress




Bradley Scott Schneider
Member of Congress



Chris Deluzio
Member of Congress




Mike Quigley
Member of Congress




Michael V. Lawler
Member of Congress



Debbie Wasserman Schultz
Member of Congress




Eugene Simon Vindman
Member of Congress



Lloyd Doggett
Member of Congress

⁷ <https://www.reuters.com/world/armenias-top-court-rejects-pro-russia-oppositions-request-throw-out-election-2026-07-04/>

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'D.G. Davis', is written over a horizontal line.

Donald G. Davis
Member of Congress